Information quality and crises in regime-change games

Resumo

When crises potentially originate from coordination failures, does a deterioration in the quality of the information available to market participants contribute towards instability? We address this question in a general global game of regime change with a unique equilibrium and illustrate the implications in a debt rollover application. We show that a reduction in the quality of information increases the likelihood of regime change, thus reducing stability, when the net payoff in the case of a successful attack is more sensitive to the fundamentals than the net payoff in the case of status quo survival. We also discuss welfare implications. © 2014 Elsevier Inc..

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2015

Instituição

Academic Press Inc.

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.1016/j.jet.2014.03.005

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/25452

Temas

PPPAdministração Pública

Palavras-chave

Global GamesPublic And Private InformationRolloverJogos globaisInformações público-privadasAdministração públicaTeoria dos jogosEstabilização econômicaParceria público-privada