Uma análise da independência do Banco Central do México através da Regra de Taylor

Resumo

This dissertation analyzes the independence of the Central Bank of Mexico through the estimation of the monetary policy reaction function known as the Taylor Rule. Two separate analyzes were carried out: one to investigate whether the Central Bank’s reaction function changed after it became legally independent and the second to determine whether the institution is influenced by the electoral cycles in the country as a way of assessing its real independence. For the first, quarterly interest rate, inflation, and output gap data from 1980 to 2019 were used. The period was divided between preindependence and post-independence, the first being from 1980 to 1994 and the second from 1994 to 2019. Through the estimation of the Taylor Rule by OLS, the results indicate that, upon becoming legally independent, the Mexican Central Bank started to give greater weight to inflation in its reaction function, which is compatible with its price stability mandate. In the second analysis, three dummy variables that seek to capture the effects of electoral cycles in the country were created. By including them in the regressions to estimate the Central Bank's reaction function, we can assess whether electoral cycles have influenced the conduct of monetary policy in Mexico. The period analyzed was from 2001 to 2019. The analysis begins in 2001 as it was the year of the last major legal change for the institution – the inflation targeting regime. Thus, it can be said that the de jure level of independence remained constant during the period and the results will not be influenced by changes in the degree of autonomy. The regressions were performed by OLS and a robustness analysis was performed by GMM. The results indicate that the Mexican Central Bank has acted independently and seeks to guarantee its credibility and autonomy during the electoral cycles.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2022

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/32040

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

Regra de TaylorIndependência do Banco CentralAutonomia do Banco CentralBanco Central do MéxicoCiclos eleitoraisTaylor RuleCentral Bank IndependenceCentral Bank AutonomyCentral Bank of MexicoElectoral cyclesEconomiaTaylor, Regra deBanco de MéxicoPolítica monetária - MéxicoMéxico - Política e governoEleições - México