Peculato e rachadinhadesafios na subsunção

Resumo

This study examines the typification of conduct by a public agent who negotiates an appointed position and shares the appointee’s salary within the scope of embezzlement, specifically in the context of public payroll kickback schemes (rachadinha). Based on hypothetical cases inspired by precedents from higher courts, the article defines rachadinha as the abuse of power by the appointing authority to arbitrarily dispose of a public employee’s remuneration. The research integrates concepts from Administrative Law, Civil Law, and Criminal Law doctrine. To resolve the legal problems identified, the study applies theory of control over the act (Schünemann) and adopts breach of duty as the general basis for imputing the result. The former criterion is only employed when the appointing authority (extraneus) instrumentalizes the will of the nominating authority (intraneus) for the commission of a potential offense. The study concludes that the conduct of the nominating authority (intraneus) cannot be subsumed under the crime of embezzlement in cases involving rachadinha scheme.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2026

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/41392

Temas

Administração PúblicaGovernança

Palavras-chave

RachadinhaPeculatoSubsunçãoDesafiosBriberyEmbezzlementSubsumptionChallengesDireitoCorrupção administrativaResponsabilidade administrativaBrasil - Servidores públicos - Salários, etc.Desfalque