Market clearing sealed-bid auctions for non-identical objects with single-unit demands

Resumo

We consider a version of the cooperative buyer-seller market game of Shapley and Shubik (1972). For this market we propose a c1ass of sealed- bid auctions where objects are sold simultaneously at a market c1earing price rule. We ana1yze the strategic games induced by these mechanisms under the complete information approach. We show that these noncooperative games can be regarded as a competitive process for achieving a cooperative outcome: every Nash equilibrium payoff is a core outcome of the cooperative market game. Precise answers can be given to the strategic questions raised.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Estudo

Ano

1999

Instituição

Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/12344

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

Competitive priceNash equilibriumMechanismOptimal matchingEconomiaEconomia matemáticaModelos econométricos