Conflict of interests within the real estate funds industryempirical evidence from trading behavior of financial institutions

Resumo

Utilizing a database from B3 (formerly BM&FBOVESPA), we have analyzed if financial institutions that provide Custody and Asset Management within the Real Estate Funds industry and also have a distribution business such as a Private Banking or Financial Advisory unit tend to trade more of its own securities than what would be expected under a non-conflicted situation and without any informational advantage. Our study englobes all transactions realized through B3 from March of 2015 to April of 2017 for the 101 most liquid Real Estate Funds and the results indicate that all financial institutions that are prone to conflicts of interest tend to exploit it. Without exception, they negotiate much more of their own securities that what would be expected if the Distribution and Asset Management business were completely independent, whereas firms that are not conflicted tend to act more in line with what would be expected, although not uniformly. Our data also suggests that conflicted financial institutions tend to underperform the reference Index.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2018

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/20470

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

Conflict of interestsInvestments - Real estate funds (Brazilian REITS)Conflito de interessesInvestimento - Real estate fundsEconomiaInstituições financeirasMercado financeiroFinanças