Brazil Takes Off? FDI outflows from Brazil's airport infrastructure under international concessionEvidence from Rio de Janeiro

Resumo

This paper explores the interactions between the state and the multinational corporations (MNC) after undertaking Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in the Brazilian airport sector. I develop a game-theory model and conduct a case study of Rio de Janeiro International Airport (Galeão) to explain the process by which the MNC renegotiates contract terms with the state, requesting a benefit to increase profits even under adverse conditions. Claiming that economic factors led to contract economic-financial imbalance, the MNC tries to create a credible commitment that it will disinvest in the business if the state does not grant a benefit. FDI outflow is therefore used as a political strategy to ensure financial returns.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Outro

Ano

2024

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/38951

Temas

PPPConcessões

Palavras-chave

Foreign Direct InvestmentAirport concessionsPolitical bargainPolitical strategyState-MNC relationsPublic-Private PartnershipsGame TheoryCiência políticaInvestimentos estrangeirosEmpresas multinacionais - Relações com o governoConcessões administrativasParceria público-privada