Bayesian foundations of Nash equilibrium behaviour

Resumo

This is part of a larger project to investigate the Bayesian foundations of non-cooperative solution concepts. Elsewhere Bernheim and Pearce prove that common knowledge of Bayesian rationality is not enough to justify the non-cooperative solution concept defined by Nash. Here several alternative behavioural assumptions are considered. In general the coordination required to achieve a Nash equilibrium is very strong. Not only Bayesian rationality, but also the actions taken, have to be common knowledge . For particular kinds of games the coordination required is not as strong.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

1986

Instituição

Sociedade Brasileira de Econometria

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

DOI

10.12660/bre.v6n11986.3119

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/27096

Temas

EconomiaDados

Palavras-chave

Bayesian foundationsNash equilibriumEconomiaTeoria dos jogosTeoria bayesiana de decisão estatística