Norm disclosure

Resumo

This paper examines how a sender strategically discloses an unknown threshold norm (e.g., performance standard) to motivate heterogeneous agents. Agents incur costs for deviating from their private baselines but gain rewards only if their actions exceed the threshold. Using a Bayesian persuasion framework with continuous states and actions, we show that optimal communication is coarse. In an optimal communication strategy each interval’s disclosed upper bound becomes the induced action, attracting the largest possible compliance from agents. When relaxing the commitment assumption is only partially binding, finer communication becomes necessary. The model concludes that strategic vagueness—not precision—optimally motivates effort by leveraging uncertainty and interval-based targets. The model concludes that strategic vagueness, not precision, optimally motivates effort by leveraging uncertainty

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2025

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/37211

Temas

EconomiaDados

Palavras-chave

PersuasãoDesenho de informaçãoNormasInformação privadaBayesian persuasionInformation designNormsPrivate informationEconomiaProcesso decisórioTeoria bayesiana de decisão estatísticaDivulgação de informações (Sociedades comerciais)Teoria dos jogosEconomia - Aspectos psicológicos