Who monitors the monitor?effect of party observers on electoral outcomes

Resumo

We show that monitoring by individuals with preferences regarding the outcome of the supervised task interferes with the task's process: the monitors bias the results in favor of their own preferences. In particular, using an original dataset from the 2011 national elections in Argentina, we exploit a (quasi) natural experiment to show that electoral observers with partisan preferences cause a 1.7% to 7% increase in the vote count of the observers' preferred party. This bias, which appears under various electoral rules, concentrates in municipalities with lower civic capital (Guiso et al. (2010)) and weakens the accountability role of elections.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2014

Instituição

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/19976

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

EleiçõesEconomiaPesquisa eleitoral