Retomando poderesa atuação do poder Legislativo na alteração do regramento constitucional sobre os poderes constitucionais do Executivo

Resumo

Constituent parliamentarians of 1988 decided to delegate constitutional powers to the Chief Executive, making him the central pivot of the Brazilian political system. In this way, the President could generate governance in a multiparty system as well as establish the balance between the three powers and, consequently, the stability of the democracy. However, from the perspective of Brazilian parliamentarians, what has been seen is an Executive who abuses his constitutional powers and uses them to consequently constrain the National Congress. In order to reestablish the balance of this relationship between Legislative and Executive, parliamentarians have sought to regain their powers delegated to the Executive by the constituents of 1988. Amendments to Constitution 32/2001, 86/2015 and 100/2019, are examples of this phenomenon because they limited the President's ability to govern by decree and edit provisional measures as well as removing from the Chief Executive the discretion in the execution of individual and bench amendments. This study seeks to test two correlational hypotheses. The first hypothesis postulates that the Legislative's motivations emerge from agency costs linked to the way in which the Executive uses its constitutional powers. The second hypothesis, on the other hand, establishes itself in the power of attraction of the presidential coalition, where only in environments of political instability of the coalition does it establish a favorable environment for the approval of the respective Amendments to the Constitution. Through a wide textual analysis of the annals of the National Congress as well as the verification of the coalition phases experienced by each of the incumbent President at the time of the promulgation of each of the Amendments to the Constitution, this study concludes that the window of opportunity created through the meeting of these two motivational and cyclical factors are the catalysts for the rescue of the Legislative powers and for the redesign of the constitutional rule that governs the relationship between the Executive and the Legislative. The main contribution of this work is to find a point of motivational and conjunctural intersection between the three amendments to the Constitution on the constitutional powers of the Chief Executive. The study of other Proposals for Amendment to the Constitution that did not find the same environment to become Amendments to the Constitution can be an important counterfactual to for the phenomenon analyzed and to the results of this study.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2021

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/30602

Temas

Administração PúblicaGovernança

Palavras-chave

Delegating powersAgency costsConstitutional powersConstitutional amendmentsCoalitionLegislative versus ExecutiveDelegação de poderesCustos de agênciaPoderes constitucionaisEmenda à ConstituiçãoCoalizãoLegislativo versus ExecutivoAdministração públicaPoder legislativoPoder executivoConstituição - Emendas