Rethinking clientelismthe political logic of demanding goods with evidence from Brazil

Resumo

This study explores how the complexity of goods demanded by citizens shapes their engagement in clientelism and social mobilization in Latin American democracies. Building on a game theory formal model and an ethnographic case study in Complexo do Alemão, I argue that citizens strategically alternate between informal and collective action depending on whether the goods are simple (e.g., food, government jobs) or complex (e.g., universal housing, education reform). The results indicate that while simple goods favor clientelistic networks, complex demands are more effectively pursued via mobilization. Electoral cycles also shift these dynamics as proximity to elections increases politicians’ incentives of provision through informal and formal channels. This approach aims to move beyond binary views of clientelism by highlighting its role as both a constraint and a redistributive mechanism in unequal democracies.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Outro

Ano

2025

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/38954

Palavras-chave

ClientelismSocial mobilizationCollective actionRedistributionDemocratic qualityLatin American politicsCiência políticaClientelismoDemocracia - América LatinaEleições - América LatinaParticipação social