Reputation with one-sided monitoringignorance as a commitment device

Resumo

I analyie a repeated two-sided incomplete information game with two long-run players in which only one of them can observe the history of the game. Using standard reputation arguments, I prove that if players are sufficiently patient, then the player with no monitoring device can secure a payoff arbitrarily close to her Stackelberg payoff; providing a novel form of equilibrium selection. (C) 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2016

Instituição

Elsevier Science Sa

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.1016/j.econlet.2016.04.017

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23619

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

ReputationOne-sided monitoringCommitmentEconomiaTeoria dos jogos