Artigo científico
Incentive constraints in games with bounded memory
Monte, Daniel
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Resumo
In this paper I analyze a repeated coordination game between a bounded memory player and a fully rational player. A bounded memory player is a player who is subject to imperfect recall, but, conditional on this constraint, acts optimally every point in time given her beliefs over the actual history of the game. I show that the results contrast with the ones in the finite automata literature. In particular, a result denoted the 'tyranny of the weak' in Gilboa and Samet (Games Econ Behav 1: 213-221, 1989) is no longer present here.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Artigo científico
- Ano
- 2014
- Instituição
- Springer Heidelberg
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Acesso restrito
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23369
- Temas
- Economia
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