Remuneração por desempenho versus remuneração fixaincentivos pós-contratuais e desempenho dos gerentes

Resumo

Top management from retail bank industry (PRINCIPAL) needs to delegate authority to lower level managers (AGENTS) under the existence of conflicting interests, asymmetric information and limited monitoring. A system of performance targets and incentives is adopted in order to induct those agents into principal’s interests. The aim of this paper is to evaluate the existence of a casual relationship between the so called “contract of guaranteed variable wage” and the performance of the lower level managers. It means, to investigate how the appliances of this implicit contract, which promote a substantial change in the direct incentive scheme, affect the performance delivered by those agents. We analyze, econometrically, data from jan.2007 to jun.2009 got from one of the largest Brazilian retail bank through an estimator of fixed effects for an unbalanced panel data. The results indicate that the agents subject to the contract of guaranteed variable wage have delivered an inferior performance compared to the agents subject to variable payment. We conclude, therefore, that problem of moral hazard can be observed on the behavior of the agents subject to this contract.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2010

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/4321

Temas

EconomiaDados

Palavras-chave

Contract theoryMoral hazardRetail bank industryPanel data analysisEconomia dos contratosIncentivosRisco moralBanco de varejoDados em painelEconomiaSistemas de remunerações salariaisSalários - AdministraçãoDesempenhoGerentes - Salários, etc.Incentivos na administração de pessoal