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Artigo científico

Political appointments and coalition management in Brazil, 2007-2010

Praça, Sérgio; Freitas, Andréa Marcondes de; Hoepers, Bruno

O documento é disponibilizado pela fonte de origem, que mantém a versão integral e as condições de uso.

Resumo

Studies on coalition management in presidential systems usually focus on two types of goods used by the president and formateur party to hold together coalitions: exchange goods (such as individual budget amendments) and coalition goods (such as ministries). This research notes analyzes, with an original dataset of party members and political appointees in Brazil, a different type of good: presidential political appointments. Our study shows that partisan political appointees vary greatly among Brazilian ministries and within them. We also found that there is a disconnect between how many seats a political party holds in Congress and the number of political appointment offices it controls. This has implications for the literature on bureaucracy and politics and the literature on coalition management.

Ficha do documento

Tipo
Artigo científico
Ano
2011
Instituição
Journal of Politics in Latin America
Idioma
Inglês
Acesso
Acesso aberto
Identificador
oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/19978

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