Optimal unemployment insurance for couples
Monteiro, Luís Fabiano Carvalho
O documento é disponibilizado pela fonte de origem, que mantém a versão integral e as condições de uso.
Resumo
This work analyzes the optimal design of an unemployment insurance program for couples, whose joint search problem in the labor market differ significantly from the problem faced by single agents. We use a version of the sequential search model of the labor market adapted to married agents to compare optimal constant policies for single and married agents, as well as characterize the optimal constant policy when the agency faces single and married agents simultaneously. Our main result is that an agency that gives equal weights to single and married agents will want to give equal utility promises to both types of agents and spend more on the single agent.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Dissertação
- Ano
- 2015
- Instituição
- Fundação Getulio Vargas
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Acesso aberto
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/13986
- Temas
- Economia
Conteúdos relacionados
- DissertaçãoO efeito da heurística da disponibilidade na demanda por seguros residenciais no BrasilFundação Getulio Vargas · 2025
- TeseThe dynamics of monetary transmission in the context of transfer policies and unemployment insuranceFundação Getulio Vargas · 2025
- Artigo científicoThe The Economic Impact of Ending a State Monopoly:EGV EPGE · 2025
- DissertaçãoLabor compensations under incomplete markets and frictionsFundação Getulio Vargas · 2025
