Delegation dilemmascoalition size, electoral risk, and regulatory design in new democracies
Pereira Filho, Carlos Eduardo Ferreira; Melo, Marcus André B. C. de; Werneck, Heitor Franco
O documento é disponibilizado pela fonte de origem, que mantém a versão integral e as condições de uso.
Resumo
This paper investigates determinants of regulatory agency design in multiparty coalition governments. Current research has mainly focused on US institutions and its findings are therefore context specific. We find electoral uncertainty, government turnover, and coalition size are key to explaining the bureaucratic autonomy with reference to the 31 state regulatory agencies that have been recently created at the subnational level in Brazil. Legislative support enjoyed by chief executives only acquires explanatory power when interacted with government turnover. Because governors have great ability in building oversized majority coalition, coalition strength influences the governor’s choice when he/she faces credible threats from rival elite groups.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Artigo científico
- Ano
- 2009
- Instituição
- Fundação Getulio Vargas
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Acesso aberto
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/20147
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