Delegation, agenda control, and budget reform in Brazil, 1999-2008
Praça, Sérgio
O documento é disponibilizado pela fonte de origem, que mantém a versão integral e as condições de uso.
Resumo
How are patterns of delegation between the president and the legislature chosen in multiparty presidential regimes? How do political actors make strategic use of legislative provisions during moments of institutional reform? This essay explores causal mechanisms related to these questions based on a case study of Brazilian budget reform from 1999 to 2008. The main findings are that legislative agenda control can be decisive for the maintenance of delegation patterns that favor governing coalitions; entrepreneurs have a real, but limited, power; and the strategic use of legislative rules may be as relevant for institutional reform as they are for regular policy making.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Artigo científico
- Ano
- 2015
- Instituição
- Latin Amer Studies Assoc
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Acesso restrito
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23506
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