An economic model of gun control

Resumo

Guns stolen from law-abiding households provide the principal source of guns for criminals. The lethality of crime instruments increases with the availability of guns, so the gun market is subject to externalities that generate excessive ownership and inadequate spending on protective measures to deter gun theft. One motive for gun ownership is self defense, and the gun market is subject to coordination failure: the more guns purchased lawfully, the more will be stolen by criminals, so the greater the incentive for lawful . consumers to purchase guns for self defense. As a result, there may be multiple equilibria in the gun market and more than one equilibrium crime rate. We show that a simple refundable deposit for guns will internalize the externalities in the gun market and may cause large downward jumps in gun ownership, the lethality of crime instruments, and the social costs of crime.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Estudo

Ano

1998

Instituição

Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/12268

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

EconomiaControle de armas