Transnational anticorruption law in actioncases from Argentina and Brazil

Resumo

Debates over whether transnational and international legal institutions are fair, effective, or legitimate responses to corruption of local public officials have an important empirical dimension. We use case studies to examine whether foreign legal institutions serve as fair, effective, and legitimate complements to local anticorruption institutions. We refer to this set of claims as the 'institutional complementarity theory.' The first case study centers on proceedings concerning bribes paid by subsidiaries of Siemens AG, a German company, to obtain and retain a contract to provide national identity cards for the Argentine government. The second case study examines events stemming from overbilling in the construction of a courthouse in Brazil. Analysis of these cases suggests that the institutional complementary theory is credible. At the same time, the findings suggest that local institutions have greater potential, and foreign institutions have more limited potential, than the theory assumes.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2015

Instituição

Blackwell Publishing Inc.

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.1111/lsi.12102

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/25455

Temas

Administração PúblicaGovernança

Palavras-chave

Anticorruption lawLei anticorrupçãoAdministração públicaDireitoCorrupção - Legislação - BrasilCorrupção - Legislação - ArgentinaCrime contra a administração pública