The efficiency of bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes under subjective evaluations

Resumo

We study a repeated principal agent model with subjective evaluations. We construct simple bonus-or-terminate incentive schemes. In these schemes, the principal evaluates the agent every T periods. The principal pays a bonus and asks the agent to work for T more periods if the evaluation is positive. The relationship is terminated if the evaluation is negative. The inefficiencies in these schemes vanish as the agent can be more frequently evaluated. This result holds generally under objective or subjective evaluations. (C) 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2014

Instituição

Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.1016/j.geb.2014.05.015

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23421

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

Principal-agent modelSubjective evaluationsEconomiaIncentivos na administração de pessoal