Teorias de autonomia relacionallições feministas ao direito

Resumo

In a previous research (HERSCOVICI, 2019, 2023) on the conceptions of autonomy used by the Brazilian Federal Supreme Court Justices to justify their ruling on Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 4.424/Federal District, namely that criminal prosecution should be unconditional in cases of minor bodily injury against women in the context of domestic violence, I argued that their legal constructions of autonomy remained stuck to the traditional liberal view of autonomy – one that is incapable of dealing with concrete subjects, denying their autonomous status, and thereby undermining their enjoyment of rights and their political struggles. If we do not want law to continue to serve as an instrument of oppression, one key aspect in this fight that deserves our attention is therefore the legal subject and the need to reconfigure it with new conceptions of autonomy that break with the traditional liberal notion once and for all. Drawing on this diagnosis and seeking for alternative conceptions that are already available to us, the present research explores how feminist philosophy has been rethinking the concept of autonomy under the umbrella term of relational autonomy and reflects on how this new relational conception of autonomy can impact on judicial decisions. What dimensions are illuminated when we look at a case through different theories of relational autonomy? It is assumed that they do not fall into the same errors as the traditional liberal view, that they are more sophisticated and appropriate to reality, and that they lead us to fairer decisions from a critical feminist point of view. Thus, the research presents this Anglophone literature to the Brazilian legal academia and, using ADI 4.424/DF as a bridge, illustrates the potential implications of the different types of relational autonomy theories for the concrete world of law. The contribution proposed here is to build repertoire: to bring from feminist philosophy into law different ways of (re)thinking autonomy so that they may serve as theoretical grounds for judges and other practitioners who want to perform their function from a feminist perspective on law, as well as for academics who want to produce feminist legal theory or feminist rewritings of judicial decisions that, like ADI 4.424/DF, are based on traditional liberal premises about the autonomous subject.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2024

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/35319

Palavras-chave

Autonomia relacionalTeoria feminista do direitoSujeitoDecisões judiciaisViolência domésticaRelational autonomyFeminist legal theorySelfJudgementsDomestic violenceDireitoTeoria feministaAutonomiaIndividualidadeJuízes - DecisõesViolência familiar