Regulação, poder de mercado e concorrência dos bancos no Brasil sob a avaliação dos conglomerados financeiros

Resumo

Maintaining a healthy banking system and with levels of competition to stimulate the supply of financial products that meets society's needs is a desirable goal, but very difficult to be achieved. A major existing difficulty is the fact competes in the same area of regulatory issues topics related to stability and competition issues - A trade-off that is not a consensus. Clearly, the banking systems are essential in the capital flows processing and in the administration of the intermediation between credit savers and borrowers (Freixas and Roche, 2007). This activity has a strong characteristic of solvency risk (Diammond and Dybvig, 1983) but yet there is no reasonable agreement about the causes and way to regulate it (Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994). On these issues, we developed a historical and institutional analysis in order to contextualize the current condition in Brazil. It is worth noting that in the banking sector, there is no consensus on how to measure some important variables for the Literature of Industrial Organization, such as Market Power and Competition Level. In due to contribute to the methodological discussion about the databases and models of competition, tests were carried out with the models Bresnahan and Lau (1982), Panzar and Rosse (1987) and Boone (2008), besides the usual measures of concentration Cn and HHI, evaluating the banking sector by Units Banks (CNPJ) and the Financial Conglomerates. The tests show there is statistical differences in the use of these bases from 2004. Another existent gap is the lack of models for the simulation of variations in supply of credit promoted by changes in the structure or in competition mode. This work also includes contributions to understanding of relationships of Market Power and the Level of Competition of the Banking Loan Market Brazil's. For this purpose, we performed tests on a structure of production function, where the results confirmed the classical hypotheses regarding the use of market power unilaterally and scale efficiency, in the level of the conglomerate banking.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Tese

Ano

2011

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/8545

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

BankingRegulation and competitionMarket Power and competitionBanking market lendingSetor bancárioRegulação concorrencialPoder de mercado e oncorrênciaMercado bancário de empréstimoEconomiaBancos - Regulamentação - BrasilConcorrênciaInstituições financeiras - Regulamentação - BrasilEmpréstimo bancário