Questioning Chase and Simon's (1973) 'Perception in Chess'The 'experience recognition' hypothesis

Resumo

Pattern recognition lies at the heart of the cognitive science endeavor. In this paper, we provide some criticism of this notion, using studies of chess as an example. The game of chess is, as significant evidence shows, a game of abstractions: pressures; force; open files and ranks; time; tightness of defense; old strategies rapidly adapted to new situations. These ideas do not arise on current computational models, which apply brute force by rote-memorization. In this paper we assess the computational models of CHREST and CHUMP, and argue that chess chunks must contain semantic information. This argument leads to a new and contrasting claim, as we propose that key conclusions of Chase and Simon's (1973) influential study stemmed from a non-sequitur. In the concluding section, we propose a shift in philosophy, from 'pattern recognition' to a framework of 'experience recognition'. © 2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2010

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.1016/j.newideapsych.2009.07.008

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/25355

Palavras-chave

AnalogyCognitive ModelsCognitive PsychologyExperience RecognitionExperimental PsychologyMemoryPerceptionCogniçãoPsicologia experimental