Quem (ainda) tem medo de dívida externa? Como uma inconstitucionalidade por omissão na regulação da dívida pública externa ameaça a soberania nacional

Resumo

The monograph starts from the following research question: How does the historical trajectory of Brazilian foreign debt regulation condition the current legislative inertia, and what are the resulting legal, internal, external, and economic risks? Thus, the hypothesis to be tested in this work is that: The historical trajectory of Brazilian foreign debt regulation, characterized by high regulatory fragmentation since the Empire, has consolidated a path dependence that discourages action by the National Congress. This scenario results in the current situation of unconstitutional omission, due to the lack of regulation of the issue by Complementary Law, as required by Articles 163, II, III, and IV of the Federal Constitution, and the insufficiency of the Fiscal Responsibility Law, which focuses on the flow and not on the management of the foreign debt stock. Therefore, the regulatory vacuum creates a triple vulnerability, internal legal, external legal, and economic, characterizing the situation of unconstitutionality by omission. In addition to dogmatic analysis, the study adopts an empirical methodology based on the collection of unpublished primary data, structured around three axes. (i) exhaustive normative and jurisprudential mapping in the databases of the Planalto, the Chamber of Deputies, and the Federal Supreme Court, covering the normative and decision-making evolution of the topic between 1824 and 2025. (ii) Analysis of 1,129 Federal Senate Resolutions on external credit operations. (iii) Systematization of institutional responses obtained via the Access to Information Act from 12 federal agencies. As a result, the findings diagnose and support the scenario of triple vulnerability of national sovereignty. (a) Internal legal vulnerability, marked by unpredictability in liability management and the fragility of infralegal norms susceptible to changes at low political cost. (b) External legal vulnerability evidenced by the systematic acceptance of pernicious clauses such as waiver of jurisdictional immunity, cross-default, and variable interest rates. (c) Economic vulnerability, characterized by the external overindebtedness of subnational entities. Therefore, as a proposal for intervention, we argue that a Direct Action of Unconstitutionality by Omission should be filed with the Federal Supreme Court to remedy the regulatory vacuum surrounding external public debt.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Outro

Ano

2025

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/38257

Temas

Finanças Públicas

Palavras-chave

Dívida pública externaOmissão inconstitucionalSoberania nacionalMapeamento normativo e jurisprudencialAção Direta de Inconstitucionalidade por OmissãoExternal public debtUnconstitutional omissionNational sovereigntyRegulatory and jurisprudential mappingDirect Action of Unconstitutionality by OmissionDireitoDívida externaSoberaniaJurisprudênciaInconstitucionalidade das leis