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Dissertação

Por que (não) litigar? Como a regulação econômica pode tornar contratos bancários com PMEs mais eficientes

Argalji, Daniel

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Resumo

The significant judicialization of banking contracts signed with small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in Brazil raises hypotheses about possible failures in the current contractual structure and the absence of incentives for cooperation. In this context, the research problem investigates whether the application of the Coase Theorem, combined with regulatory mechanisms, can contribute to the reduction of litigation in these relationships. The theoretical framework is based on the Economic Analysis of Law (EAL), starting from the premise that standardized contracts, marked by rigidity and asymmetry, hinder renegotiations and favor the judicial route. The research method is developed from three analytical fronts: the examination of the limits of private autonomy in asymmetric environments; the empirical analysis of judicial behavior based on data from the Central Bank and courts; and the comparative study with international regulatory experience. The theme acquires relevance given the negative impact of litigation on the business environment and access to credit. The central proposal consists of demonstrating that the reduction of litigation depends on the creation of regulatory incentives that promote cooperative conduct and increase transparency. Thus, the dissertation is inserted in the research line “Economics, Intervention and Regulatory Strategies”, by investigating the content of regulatory options and proposing legal responses to market problems, aiming at the adequate orientation of incentive systems and economic efficiency.

Ficha do documento

Tipo
Dissertação
Ano
2026
Instituição
Fundação Getulio Vargas
Idioma
Português
Acesso
Acesso aberto
Identificador
oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/38213

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