O Poder do voto como fator determinante na distribuição de recursos estaduais para os municípios cearenses

Resumo

This research assesses whether state discretionary grants are distributed in a way that privileges municipalities that bring a higher percentage of votes to the state government in the electoral process. The analysis is carried out with the application of a model in a dynamic nonlinear panel, where the distribution scheme depends on the percentage of votes, in the case of Ceará municipalities in the period 2009-2018. Estimates indicate that the municipalities that provided a greater number of votes to the governor were granted more resources from discretionary grants; and this positive relationship is further amplified with the conquest of 51% of local votes. This result is compatible with Cox and McCubbins (1986) model of risk-averse political candidates. In
 addition, there was also the occurrence of political cycles in voluntary transfers and the absence of a relationship between the amounts transferred and whether the mayor and the party alliance between mayor and governor.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2022

Instituição

Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (Ipea)

Fonte

Repositório do Ipea

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.ipea.gov.br:11058/11631

Licença

Licença Comum

Abrangência

Ceará; 2009-2018

Temas

Gestão Municipal

Palavras-chave

EleiçõesCondições EconômicasPesquisa EconômicaTransferências voluntáriasModelos em painel