Mercosur's temporary import tariff reductionsmoney or information?

Resumo

We perform a micro-level investigation of the political economy of trade policy using a novel dataset from Brazil on a Mercosur’s program that allows the temporary import tariff reduction of up to 45 products simultaneously. Requests are made by firms, which can use political influence to increase the chances of having their request approved. We analyze which sort of lobby, if any at all, is more relevant to the government when approving requests. In addition, we develop and estimate a structural model to test whether the government behaves as a forwardlooking agent in face of the ceiling restriction posed by Mercosur. We find that informational lobbying is more relevant than campaign contributions when shifting the probabilities of approval, and that the intertemporal restriction does not seem to significantly affect the government’s approval process.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2019

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/27628

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

International tradePolitical economyMercosurImport tariffsDiscrete choice dynamic programmingLobbyingComércio internacionalEconomia políticaMercosulTarifas de importaçãoProgramação dinâmica em escolha discretaEconomiaTarifas alfandegárias - BrasilImposto de importaçãoPolítica comercialGrupos de pressão