Mercado de capitais e desenvolvimento

Resumo

Brazilian corporations tend to sell mainly preferred shares instead of common shares in the stock market. This paper analyses some of the consequences of this practice. We argue that it tends to displace long term investors which may perform a double function: monitor activities that prevent undesirable practices of the managers and stabilize the market reducing the chances of hostile takeovers. We develop the conditions under which management monitoring services are offered taking into account its public good nature and the reputational problems involved that result in under-supply of this activity. It is also analysed how the participation of these long term investors in the market affects the action of arbitrageurs trying to extract signs from the market in order to profit from prices out of their fundamental values.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Relatório

Ano

2005

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/3154

Palavras-chave

Public goodsFinancial marketsMonitoramentoInvestidores de longo prazoAdministração de empresasBens públicosMercado financeiro