Making sense of health corruption in times of COVID-19

Resumo

This paper provides readers with an analytical framework to better understand the rationality of corruption and its perpetuation in the health sector during the coronavirus pandemics. To pursue the foregoing task, it embarks on integrating insights from New Institutional Economics, Public Choice Theory, and the Austrian School of Economics to come up with an explanation of corrupt deals that uncover their causally relevant mechanisms. Its goal is to shed light on corruption risks that emerge from changes in legislation that weakened public procurement rules and therefore turned the Brazilian health system more vulnerable to corrupt acts. The article conjectures that increased uncertainty, asymmetric information, and decreased transparency channels have played major roles in triggering corrupt practices, such as bribery, kickback, embezzlement, influence peddling, and cronyism. More precisely, it argues that rent-seeking and predatory political entrepreneurship are two driving forces behind Brazilian corrupt exchanges and their risks in times of the COVID-19 pandemic. It offers some evidence that corruption scandals in Rio de Janeiro state make a very good case for showing the explanatory value of the proposed theoretical approach. It closes by wrapping up the overall argument, presenting some policy implications and questions for further research.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2021

Instituição

Escola Nacional de Administração Pública - Enap

Fonte

Revista do Serviço Público

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:ojs.pkp.sfu.ca:article/5715

Licença

http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-sa/4.0

Temas

Compras PúblicasGovernança

Palavras-chave

corruptionhealthinstitutionsrent-seekindpolitical entrepreneurshiprent-seeking