Estudo de poder de mercado em sistemas de geração de energia elétrica

Resumo

The Brazilian electrical system has undergone great changes in its regulation in the last decades in order to increase the efficiency of the market based on the incentive to the competition among the agents. The incentive to the entry of private generators has generated significant results the competition and has caused a restructuring that has modified the operation before totally centralized to decentralized models that stimulate the competition between agents. The objective of this work is to analyze the market power in hydrothermal systems that is, based on thermal and hydroelectric generation, using low cost models for centralized systems and Nash Cournot model for decentralized systems both decoupled in time in order to obtain the dispatch great. The analysis extends to the strategic behavior of the agents for time coupled systems using low cost models for centralized systems and Nash Cournot model using stochastic programming resources to determine the optimal dispatch of the agents of the market. It has been shown that in markets with few agents, the benefit of diverting from collusion only occurs at high discount rates. With the inclusion of a greater number of agents, it is identified that the incentive to the deviation of collusion has unbelievable rates. It will be shown that for time-coupled models the behavior of a possible collusion will cause the agents to sustain the higher spot price, even in periods of low affluence.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2017

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/18705

Temas

EconomiaInfraestruturaDesenvolvimento Econômico

Palavras-chave

Hydrothermal systemsMarket powerNash-Cournot equilibriumCollusionSistemas hidrotérmicosPoder de mercadoEquilíbrio de Nash CournotColusãoEconomiaRecursos energéticosBolsa de mercadoriasEnergia - Indústria