Disentangling the effect of private and public cash flows on firm value

Resumo

This paper presents a simple model for dual-class stock shares, in which common shareholders receive both public and private cash flows (i.e. dividends and any private benefit of holding voting rights) and preferred shareholders only receive public cash flows (i.e. dividends). The dual-class premium is driven not only by the firm's ability to generate cash flows, but also by voting rights. We isolate these two effects in order to identify the role of voting rights on equity-holders' wealth. In particular, we employ a cointegrated VAR model to retrieve the impact of the voting rights value on cash flow rights. We finnd a negative relation between the value of the voting right and the preferred shareholders' wealth for Brazilian cross- listed firms. In addition, we examine the connection between the voting right value and market and firm specific risks.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Estudo

Ano

2017

Instituição

Escola de Economia de São Paulo

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/18018

Temas

Economia

Palavras-chave

Private benefitsVoting rightDial-class sharesEconomiaEmpresas - AvaliaçãoAções (Finanças)