Discrete public goods with incomplete information
Monteiro, Paulo Klinger; Temimi, Akram; Menezes, Flavio Marques
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Resumo
We analyze simultaneous discrete public good games wi.th incomplete information and continuous contributions. To use the terminology of Admati and Perry (1991). we consider comribution and subscription games. In the former. comrioutions are :1ot rcfunded if the project is not completed. while in thp. iatter they are. For the special case whp.re provision by a single player is possible we show the existence of an equilibrium in Doth cootribution and subscription games where a player decides to provide the good by himself. For the case where is not feasible for a single player to provide the good by himself, we show that any equilibriwn of both games is inefficient. WE also provide a sufficient condition for 'contributing zero' to be the unique equilibrium of the contribution garoe with n players and characterize e<!uilibria of the subscription game involving positive contributions.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Estudo
- Ano
- 1999
- Instituição
- Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Não informado
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/12250
- Temas
- Economia
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