Crime and punishment in classrooma game-theoretic approach for student cheating

Resumo

We provide the microeconomic foundations of cheating in classroom through a static game with complete information. Our setting is composed by two students, who must choose whether or not to cheat, and a professor, who must choose how much effort to exert in trying to catch dishonest students. Our findings support the determinants of cheating found by the empirical literature, mainly those related to the penalty's level. It is also emphasized the importance of professors being well-motivated (with low disutility of effort) and worried about fairness in classroom. The two extensions of the baseline model reinforce the importance of the cost-benefit analysis to understand dishonest behavior in classroom.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2017

Instituição

EGV EPGE

Fonte

Revista Brasileira de Economia

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/60607

Palavras-chave

student cheatinggame theoryacademic dishonesty