Centralized decision making and informed lobbying

Resumo

We address the trade- off between centralized and decentralized decision making subject to influence from privately informed lobbies. We focus on informative equilibria with separating differentiable contribution schedules and identify an information transmission effect under centralized structures. Such effect decreases capture and increases welfare when lobbies have 'aligned preferences.' The opposite effect holds for 'polarized preferences.' We present two examples of this framework: local public goods and customs union agreements. Finally, we compare the policy outcomes from this political economy perspective to those under a normative mechanism design approach, and extend our analysis to the discussion of pooling equilibria.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2017

Instituição

Amer Economic Assoc

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.1257/mic.20150253

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23820

Temas

EconomiaDesenvolvimento Regional

Palavras-chave

Free-trade agreementsPolitical-economy approachAsymmetric informationFederalismDecision makingCentralization versus decentralizationEconomiaDescentralização governamentalFederalismoProcesso decisório