Campaign donation and government contracts in Brazilian states
Arvate, Paulo Roberto; Barbosa, Klênio; Fuzitani, Eric
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Resumo
A corporate firm may influence policies in its favor by transferring money to political candidates. However, empirical studies which document evidence about the return on campaign donations are rare (Großer, Reuben and Tymula, 2013). In this paper we estimate the net expected return of a campaign donation in eight Brazilian states using a Regression Discontinuity Design (RDD) to separate the return of winning and losing state deputy candidates in the electoral coalition in 2006. Our results show that that the net return is quite high (i.e., the investment of donor firms is almost 2% of the net expected return), and is larger among traditional electoral parties than any other parties, on average. Looking at the heterogeneity of local executive and legislative levels, we find that net returns are higher when donor firms finance deputies within a governor’s electoral coalition than deputies outside this coalition.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Estudo
- Ano
- 2013
- Instituição
- Fundação Getulio Vargas
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Não informado
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/11325
- Temas
- Economia
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