"``Bozo" or "``Mito"? Ruling as an Outsider in Brazil

Resumo

We design a signaling model to explain how a political outsider (the president) can implement his agenda without sharing power with establishment politicians. The president has two strategies: to ally with traditional political parties or to nomi-nate a popular public figure perceived by the public as a corruption fighter. Given that the president’s type (honest or dishonest) is uncertain, the presence of the public figure in the government may legitimize the presidency by signaling that the president is honest. If the signal is informative, the president can implement his agenda. We demonstrate that, under certain conditions, both separating and aggregating equilibria can exist. Moreover, the quality of institutions and the cost of allying with the establishment are the primary factors influencing the president’s choice. Our model serves as a valuable tool for analyzing the success of policies implemented by this increasingly common type of politician around the world, particularly when their legitimacy depends on popular figures.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2025

Instituição

EGV EPGE

Fonte

Revista Brasileira de Economia

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Não informado

Identificador

oai:ojs.periodicos.fgv.br:article/88197

Abrangência

Brasil

Temas

EconomiaGovernança

Palavras-chave

Outsiders PolíticosInstituiçõesAmérica LatinaBrasilEconomia Política