A strategic analysis of trade and public environmental goods

Resumo

As concerns with native forests preservation mount around the globe, free trade deals have gained the spotlight for increasing the incentives to deforestation. This paper shows how two countries, one with native forest and the other without it, use trade tariffs in a non-cooperative infinite horizon game to maximize their welfare functions in a micro founded model with myopic leaders, and shows the shortcomings of an agreement in a finite horizon game.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2022

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/32328

Palavras-chave

Issue LinkageEnvironmental ConservationTrade AgreementsFlorestas - ConservaçãoRecursos naturais - ConservaçãoProtecionismo e livre câmbioComércio internacional