A cobrança de remuneração de descontinuidade na destituição do gestor em fundos de investimento

Resumo

This study analyzes the possibility of charging a Discontinuation Fee (Remuneração de Descontinuidade) in the event of the removal of an investment fund's portfolio manager. The research examines the manager’s enhanced regulatory role under the current framework, the contractual logic governing removal, and the effects of “hostile takeovers” of fund management as one of the contributors to the emergence of this extraordinary form of remuneration. Based on a statutory, regulatory, and doctrinal analysis, the study concludes that such a fee is fully permissible in funds aimed at qualified and professional investors, where it may take either a compensatory or indemnificatory nature. In funds for the general public (fundos de varejo), however, and in accordance with the CVM Board’s position, its viability is limited to the payment of a performance fee, shared between the removed manager and the successor, while the charging of any management fee (taxa de gestão) after removal is prohibited.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Outro

Ano

2025

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/38330

Palavras-chave

Mercado de capitaisDireito societárioDireito civilFundos de investimentoResolução CVM 175DestituiçãoJusta causaRemuneração de descontinuidadeDireitoFundos de investimentos