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Estudo

Who matters in dynamic coordination problems?

Guimaraes, Bernardo; Jardanovski, Gabriel

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Resumo

This paper studies a dynamic coordination model with timing frictions and heterogeneity in several dimensions. Each agent might a ect and be a ected by others in di erent ways, and the frequency of their decisions might di er. There is a unique equilibrium in the model. At times, the economy might be stuck in an ine cient low-output equilibrium, and subsidies can improve welfare. The optimal subsidy does not depend on each type's timing frictions: at each point in time, the planner should simply compensate each agent for its externality on others at that particular moment.

Ficha do documento

Tipo
Estudo
Ano
2021
Instituição
Escola de Economia de São Paulo
Idioma
Inglês
Acesso
Acesso aberto
Identificador
oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/30801

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