The accountability drifteconomic voting and its limits across democracies

Resumo

In this doctoral dissertation, I examine the limitations of economic voting as a mechanism of democratic accountability. I am particularly interested in how biases and perceptions related to economic performance influence vote and popularity, with a focus on the U.S., Mexico, and OECD countries. In the first essay, I analyze how affect for political figures in the U.S. influences retrospective evaluations of the economy. In the second essay, I examine how exogenous conditions in the U.S. economy determine Mexican presidential success. Finally, in the third essay, I explore how affective polarization influences the assignment of responsibility for the economy in OECD countries. Within this scope, I question the extent to which voters can effectively hold governments accountable through economic voting in different political and economic contexts.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Dissertação

Ano

2025

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/38106

Temas

EconomiaDesenvolvimento Econômico

Palavras-chave

Economic votingDemocratic accountabilityMisattribution of responsibilityPopularityHeuristicsExogenous shocksPolarizationAdministraçãoVotoDesenvolvimento econômicoEleiçõesPesquisa eleitoral