Artigo científico
Sovereign default risk and commitment for fiscal adjustment
Gonçalves, Carlos Eduardo Soares; Guimarães, Bernardo
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Resumo
This paper studies fiscal policy in a model of sovereign debt and default A time inconsistency problem arises: since the price of past debt cannot be affected by current fiscal policy and governments cannot credibly commit to a certain path of tax rates, debtor countries choose suboptimally low fiscal adjustments. An international organization, capable of designing a contract that coaxes debtors into a tougher fiscal stance via the provision of cheap senior lending in times of crisis, can work as a commitment device and improve social welfare. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier B.V.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Artigo científico
- Ano
- 2015
- Instituição
- Elsevier Science Bv
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Acesso restrito
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23452
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