Reelecting corrupt incumbents in exchange for public goodsrouba mas faz in Brazil
Pereira, Carlos; Melo, Marcus André B. C. de
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Resumo
This article addresses the paradox of unpopular corruption and popular corrupt politicians. It explores why corrupt politicians are reelected, paying particular attention to incumbent provision of public goods and voter information on incumbent misconduct. Using a new data set on mayoral elections (2000 and 2004) in the Brazilian state of Pernambuco, we specify econometric models to test the hypothesis that incumbents' performance in delivering public goods might mitigate reputational losses. Our main empirical analysis suggests that (1) corruption decreases the probability of incumbent reelection, (2) public expenditure increases the probability of reelection, and (3) the negative marginal effect of corruption on reelection disappears as public expenditure increases.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Artigo científico
- Ano
- 2015
- Instituição
- Latin Amer Studies Assoc
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Acesso restrito
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23558
- Temas
- Governança
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