Pure strategy equilibria of single and double auctions with interdependent values
Araújo, Aloísio Pessoa de; Castro, Luciano Irineu de
O documento é disponibilizado pela fonte de origem, que mantém a versão integral e as condições de uso.
Resumo
We prove the existence of monotonic pure strategy equilibrium for many kinds of asymmetric auctions with n bidders and unitary demands, interdependent values and independent types. The assumptions require monotonicity only in the own bidder's type. The payments can be a function of all bids. Thus, we provide a new equilibrium existence result for asymmetrical double auctions and a small number of bidders. The generality of our setting requires the use of special tie-breaking rules. We present an example of a double auction with interdependent values where all equilibria are trivial, that is, they have zero probability of trade. This is related to Akerlof's 'market for lemmons' example and to the 'winner's curse,' establishing a connection between them. However, we are able to provide sufficient conditions for non-trivial equilibrium existence. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Artigo científico
- Ano
- 2009
- Instituição
- Academic Press Inc Elsevier Science
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Acesso restrito
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23118
- Temas
- Economia
Conteúdos relacionados
- Artigo científicoAmbiguity aversion in the long runAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Science · 2016
- Artigo científicoRegulating collateral-requirements when markets are incompleteAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Science · 2012
- Artigo científicoGeneral equilibrium, wariness and efficient bubblesAcademic Press Inc Elsevier Science · 2011
- Artigo científicoLong-lived collateralized assets and bubblesElsevier Science Sa · 2011
