Os Grandes perdedores em pregõesinfortúnio ou conduta anticompetitiva ?

Resumo

This study aims to investigate anticompetitive behaviors and propose elements to support the monitoring and prevention activities in detecting collusion in public procurement, using resources already available to control authorities. The research hypothesizes that big losers in biddings behave like members of bidding rings, sustained by side payments from the winners. The econometric analysis, based on multiple linear regression models, examines the relationship between the presence of these losers, the level of final awarded prices, and the number of participants in the tenders. The results indicate that the presence of these losers is associated with a significant increase in prices, despite the evidence of a higher number of competitors in the auction. This suggests anticompetitive practices where the participants coordinate actions to manipulate prices, while maintaining an appearance of competition. The conclusions emphasize the need for effective screening methods and regulatory interventions to protect the integrity of public procurement processes.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Outro

Ano

2024

Instituição

Ipea

Fonte

Repositório do Ipea

Idioma

Português

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.ipea.gov.br:11058/18857

Licença

Licença Padrão Ipea

Abrangência

Brasil

Temas

Administração PúblicaCompras Públicas

Palavras-chave

LicitaçãoAdministração PúblicaFiscalização de licitaçõesCartel em pregõesPráticas anticompetitivasA nálise econométrica