Information, accountability and corruptionshaping electoral accountability: evidence from Brazil

Resumo

How the interaction between ideology and salience of corruption drives electoral accountability in Brazil? This paper will study if left-wing politicians are more electorally punished for being corrupt than non-left-wing ones in Brazil’s municipal elections. The turmoil period between the July 2013 protests and President Dilma Rousseff’s leaving office in August 2016 portrayed corruption as the main topic of discussion for Brazil’s population and left-wing politicians were portrayed as the main characters. Does increasing the salience and focusing this narrative on one ideology increases electoral accountability? I will study this by running a cross-section analysis encompassing Brazilian municipalities from 2004 to 2016, which will test if (i) left-wing politicians are more electorally punished for being corrupt and if (ii) the increase in salience leads to an increase in electoral accountability. The results indicate that being a left-wing candidate previously listed by the TCU does not reduce the chances of being elected. To be overall previously involved in corruption, however, is indeed correlated with lower chances of election, mainly for the first years of the study, 2004 and 2008.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Outro

Ano

2022

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/33458

Temas

Governança

Palavras-chave

InformationAccountabilityCorruptionCiência políticaDivulgação de informaçõesCorrupção na políticaResponsabilidade (Direito)Eleições locais