Hybrid Auctions ITheory
Menezes, Flavio Marques; Dutra, Joísa Campanher
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Resumo
In this paper we examine the properties of a hybrid auction that combines a sealed bid and an ascending auction. In this auction, each bidder submits a sealed bid. Once the highest bid is known, the bidder who submitted it is declared the winner if her bid is higher than the second highest by more than a predetermined amount or percentage. If at least one more bidder submitted a bid su¢ciently close to the highest bid (that is, if the di¤erence between this bid and the highest bid is smaller than the predetermined amount or percentage) the quali…ed buyers compete in an open ascending auction that has the highest bid of the …rst stage as the reserve price. Quali…ed bidders include not only the highest bidder in the …rst stage but also those who bid close enough to her. We show that this auction generates more revenue than a standard auction. Although this hybrid auction does not generate as much revenue as the optimal auction, it is ex-post e¢cient.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Estudo
- Ano
- 2001
- Instituição
- Escola de Pós-Graduação em Economia da FGV
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Não informado
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/405
- Temas
- Economia
- Palavras-chave
- Hybrid auctionsExpected revenueEfficiencyEconomiaLeilões
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- Artigo científicoAuctions with synergies and asymmetric buyersElsevier Science Sa · 2004
