High-level federal bureaucracy and policy formulationthe case of the Bolsa Família program

Resumo

This article is a contribution to the study of the decision-making behind social policies. The literature usually stresses the role of elected politicians and the parliament in framing policies and underestimates governmental stakeholders, who do not hold elected offices, and bureaucrats. This article aims to highlight the active role of high-level federal bureaucrats in the design of policies. The analysis reclaims the classical categories and concepts developed by Lindblom (1980) and Crozier (1964), which points to the hybrid behaviour of bureaucrats and politically-appointed actors. Our aim is to show that decision-making is the result of the interactions between elected politicians and hybrid high-level federal bureaucracy, who organize themselves in groups around different technical-political projects. The analysis is developed through a case study of a policy that resulted in the merger of the existing federal conditional cash transfer programs, and generated one of the most globally-recognized social policies of Brazil, the Bolsa Família Program, in 2003.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2016

Instituição

Associação Brasileira de Ciência Política

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso aberto

DOI

10.1590/1981-38212016000300008

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/21057

Temas

Administração Pública

Palavras-chave

BureaucracyGame of powerHybridismBolsa Família ProgramLula governmentCiência políticaBrasil - Política socialPrograma Bolsa Família (Brasil)Burocracia