General equilibrium with endogenous securities and moral hazard
Braido, Luís H. B.
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Resumo
This paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies in which the individuals' endowments depend on privately observed effort choices and the financial markets are endogenous. The environment is modeled as a two-stage game. Individuals first make strategic financial-innovation decisions. They then act in a Radner-type economy with the previously designed securities. Consumption goods, portfolios, and effort levels are chosen competitively (i.e., taking prices as given). An equilibrium concept is adapted for these moral hazard economies and its existence is proven. It is shown through an example how incentive motives might lead to the endogenous emergence of financial incompleteness.
Ficha do documento
- Tipo
- Artigo científico
- Ano
- 2005
- Instituição
- Springer
- Fonte
- Repositório da FGV
- Idioma
- Inglês
- Acesso
- Acesso restrito
- Identificador
- oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/23055
- Temas
- Economia
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