Games with discontinuous payoffsA strengthening of Reny's existence theorem

Resumo

We provide a pure Nash equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs whose hypotheses are in a number of ways weaker than those of the theorem of Reny (1999). In comparison with Reny's argument, our proof is brief. Our result subsumes a prior existence result of Reny (1999) that is not covered by his theorem. We use the main result to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in a class of finite games in which agents' pure strategies are subsets of a given set, and in turn use this to prove the existence of stable configurations for games, similar to those used by Schelling (1971, 1972) to study residential segregation, in which agents choose locations. © 2011 The Econometric Society.

Ficha do documento

Tipo

Artigo científico

Ano

2011

Instituição

Fundação Getulio Vargas

Fonte

Repositório da FGV

Idioma

Inglês

Acesso

Acesso restrito

DOI

10.3982/ECTA8949

Identificador

oai:repositorio.fgv.br:10438/25384

Palavras-chave

Better-reply securityDiagnosable gamesDiscontinuous payoffsExistence of equilibriumMultiple restrictional securityNoncooperative gamesPure nash equilibriumResidential segregationJogos